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ISLAM AS A WAY OF DEFINING THE NATIONAL IDENTITY OF BOSNIAN 
MUSLIMS 
 
By Athanasios G. Athanasiadis 
 
Dr. Athanasios G. Athanasiadis, is a tutor of Slavic History at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki and 
has taught “Islam and the Balkans” at the University of Western Macedonia (Greece). He is involved in 
the contemporary and latter cultural and religious history of the countries of Ex-Yugoslavia, researching 
the modern religious-political relationships between the Croatians, Serbs and Bosnians and publishing 
conferences papers and journal articles. He is the author of the monograph “The Civil War in Yugoslavia 
1990-1995: Historical and Religious Aspects” (Thessaloniki, 2008). He is also strongly interested in the 
activities of the Greek community in Zemun (Serbia) during the 18th and 19th century. 	  	  
Abstract: Political changes in Yugoslavia in the 1990s triggered a series of changes in the ethno-religious 
field. The ethnological problems faced by the residents of Bosnia formed part of more general 
ethnological reshuffling in former Yugoslavia, promoting idealized nations, non-existent ethnic 
ideologies and fabricated state designs. However, these nations already constitute part of the reshuffling 
of the reform of New Europe. A major part was played in the formulation of the ethnic identity of 
Bosnian Muslims by the Islamic Community, under unique conditions and in cooperation with the 
Communist Yugoslavia of Josip Broz Tito from 1945 to 1990. The description and analysis of these 
conditions are described in this article. 
 
 
* * * * * 
 
In the early 20th century, before World War I erupted, in the central Balkans and, more 
specifically, in the geographical area of Bosnia, the first attempts to assert the national rights of 
the Muslim community appeared, admittedly under adverse conditions. During the same period, 
major changes were occurring in the broader Balkan region. Political developments within the 
Ottoman Empire with the Young Turk Revolution (1908), combined with reshuffling in the 
political scene of central Europe, led to the annexation of Bosnia in 1909 under Hapsburg 
dominance. This was the outset for the overturn of the Muslim people’s geopolitical aspirations 
and the claim that they bore in view of their independence. Thus, the Young Turk diplomacy lost 
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significant pivotal influence in the Balkan diplomatic scene.1 In 1901 Ehli-Islam describes this 
claim as follows:  
… The pressure exercised against Bosnia and against its Serbian and Muslim residents by 
Kállay (Benjamin Kállay, 1839-1903)2 and his government is so intense and unfair that it 
drives them to emigrate, leaving behind their fatherland.  The reason for this misfortune 
is double: the government does not allow them educational independence and the right to 
property and their persecution is continued and their property assets usurped, while, on 
the other hand, foreign residents are allowed to enter their land, which results in it being 
impossible for them to grow socially, commercially, religiously.3 
In order to fully elaborate on the matter, we consider it necessary to highlight certain basic 
principles that make up 'Islamic ideology' as a social phenomenon and are associated with the 
concepts of nation and history. One such aspect is the widely accepted view that Muslim 
teachings cohesively connect spiritual and secular people and, therefore, the overall activity of 
the faithful.4 The historical conjuncture is portentous: the juxtaposition of the West and the 
Islamic world counted its losses in Algeria following the extreme reactions regarding the Satanic 
Verse'5 by Ahmed Salman Rushdie: unprecedented violence which led to another 'civil' war that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 On February 26, 1909, Turkey officially recognized the annexation of Bosnia. It was during this period 
that the centuries-long, direct dependence and manipulation of the Muslim population by the 
Constantinople center came to an end. Bosnian-Muslim historians regard this development as a major 
loss, as desertion, which, ultimately, had a deep impact on relations between the two peoples – cf. M. 
Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka,[History of Bosniaks] (Novi Pazar: Centar za bošnjačke studije 'Kulturna 
baština Bošnjaka', 2007), pp. 418-423 and 429. Soon, however, politicians and institutionalized agencies 
representing the Bosnian-Muslim society recognized the sovereignty of the Hapsburgs so they could be 
included into a legitimate regime. 
2 Kállay had excellent knowledge of the ethnic composition of Southern Slavs in general and the presence 
of Serbs in Bosnia, given that he had served as a Consul in Belgrade from 1867 to 1875. His work Istorija 
Srba [History of Serbs] was written in 1882 and does not seem to be disputing, historically or 
ethnographically, the ethnic dominance of Serbs over Bosnia, although he would later express somewhat 
differentiated views.     
3  Ehli-Islam, Bezakonja okupacione uprave u Bosni i Hercegovini [Unlawfulness of Occupational 
Authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina](Beograd: Čigoja Štampa, 2001), pp. 32-33. The first edition was 
published in Novi Sad, Srpska Štamparija 'Sv. Miletića' in 1901. Ehli-Islam lucidly describes the 
disenfranchisement of Muslim and Orthodox populations and the strengthening of the Roman Catholic 
clergy in Bosnia during this period. The author describes the Serb-Muslim connection that was growing 
against the "common persecutor", the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 
4 In regard to the relation developed between nationalistic ideologies and the involvement of religion with 
the collateral phenomena accompanying it, see P. Lekkas, “Εθνικιστική ιδεολογία” [Nationalistic 
Ideology], Five Working Hypotheses in Historical Sociology, (Athens: Katarti Publications, 1996), pp. 
163-194.  
5Ahmed Salman Rushdie, 'The Satanic Verses', (Athens: Psychogios Publications, 1988). This is the case 
of an Anglo-Indian prize winning author, who published a book under this title which the Islamic world 
considered to be blasphemous to Prophet Mohammed. A barrage of recriminations by Islamic 
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broke out in 1992 and ended in 1997. In an Islamic context, the concept of state should be 
perceived as inherently expressing both religious and political ideology. Furthermore, it should 
be considered a given fact that during the Ottoman occupation of the Balkans, particularly in the 
southern Slavic countries, there was no consciousness of the term “nation” in the contemporary 
sense.   
Nevertheless, in order to define Islam in relation to the religiousness cultivated by its 
faithful in Bosnia, we need to investigate its fundamental institutions and structural aspects: the 
umma (faithful people), the shari’a (Islamic law), the madrasa institution (religious school), the 
waqf as foundations, the ulama (scholar-priests), the Islamic community, as well as their 
relationships with the political scene at any given time. It should be added that movements or 
religious trends, revisionary or conservative, which develop both within the community and in 
the broader Islamic world play an important role.6  
In the particular multi-ethnic and multi-religious context of Bosnia, the picture perceived 
by the international community had a favorable effect,7 shaping a different mentality among 
Muslim citizens themselves, most of whom – as part of the single state of Yugoslavia and, by 
extension, of Europe—felt European and assumed a European attitude. Sarajevo and its political 
leadership are clearly oriented towards the vision of “United Europe.” Credited with the 
experience of the successful 1984 Winter Olympics, they literally looked towards the West, 
although the social structures and behaviors are characterized as Eastern in nature.8 At this point, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
fundamentalists ensued, led by the 'fatwa' issued by the Iranian religious leader 
Ayatullah  Khomeini  (1902-1989) in 1989, according to which any Muslim had the right to kill Rushdie; 
in fact, a price was put on the author's head. Assassinations of translators and publishers of the book 
followed, protests by thousands of Islam followers and intense “religious terrorism” on the part of 
religious leaders. This was the prevailing climate a short while before the war broke out in Bosnia, which, 
in our opinion, had an impact on both the domestic Muslim community and the international Islamic 
climate. 
6F. Karčić, Društveno-pravni aspekti islamskog reformizma,[Socio-legal Aspects of Islmic Reformism] 
(Sarajevo: Islamski Teološki Fakultet, 1990). 
7 Cf. the professor's view regarding the role of Islam in South-East Europe – S. Balić, “Povijesni značaj 
islama za jugoistočnu Europu: (s posebnim osvrtom na Bosnu),” [Historical Significance of Islam ofr 
Southeast Europe (With Special Attention on Bosnia] Behar 37 (1998): pp. 8–11. 
8 Women do not wear the chador or the burka, of course, in the strict manner that this is encountered in 
other, mainly Arabic, countries. Men rarely wear a fez; they behave in a civilized manner and generally 
present a secularized attitude, more in tune with western Muslim standards. They often enter into mixed 
marriages and widely consume alcohol. Such conduct implies the penetration of secularized Islam into 
society. See N. Perišić, Mješoviti brak u BiH‐ Od poželjnog do prezrenog – mješoviti brak kao kulturna i 
politička kategorija u savremenoj BiH, [Mixed Marriage in B&H—From Desired to Rejected—Mixed 
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we would agree with the semiotic observation of Professor Darko Tanasković, who, presenting 
the social idiosyncrasy of these people, noted:  
...The Bosnian Muslims are not fervent Mujahedin. They are more passive citizens; many 
of them are professors, teachers, physicians, farmers... these are people who identify 
elements of their national uniqueness in their religion. The everyday lifestyle of most 
young Muslims is distanced from religious mandates.9  
This social reality lays the foundation for the European dream of Bosnian Muslims.10  
As a religious entity, Islam has a radical impact on the thinking of the faithful and 
contributes to the meaning of their political views and historical positions. The term 'musliman', 
signifying a person of the Muslim faith, although a purely religious one, exceeds its religious 
character in the case of the southern Slavic residents of Bosnia and acquires ethno-political 
meaning so as to confer a specific political identity.11 Furthermore, the 'Bošnjaštvo'12 concept of 
national obsession is strongly associated with its religious counterpart of musliman. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Marriage as Culture and Political Category in Contemporary B&H](Sarajevo: Friedrich‐Ebert‐Stiftung, 
2012), and M. Milenković, Od Libana [From Lebanon], op. cit., p. 94. For differences among Bosnian 
Muslims see also Gilles Kepel, Jihad, the Holy War, trans. Eleni Tserezole (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2001), 
pp. 359-382. 
9 D. Tanasković, Zašto se prikriva radikalizacija islama na Balkanu? [Why is the Radicalization of Islam 
in the Balkans Hidden?] in  Islam i mi, [Islam and We] (Beograd: Partenon, 2000), p. 86.  
10 This does not mean that there is absolute identification between Bosnian Muslims and those “beyond 
Gibraltar” or even with those living in Europe who are not native residents, such as Bosnian Muslims. See 
the well-documented article by X. Bougarel Bosnian Islam as “European Islam”, Islam in Europe 
(Diversity, Identity and Influence), ed. Aziz Al-Azmeh (Budapest: Central European University, E. Fokas, 
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 2008), pp. 96-124.  
11 This position is encountered in the works of all Bosnian Muslim historians, e.g. M. Imamović, M. 
Filipović, S. Balić, R. Mahmućehajić, etc. See A. Zilkić, “Historijski značaj islama na 
Balkanu,”[Historical Meaning of Islam in the Balkans] in Islamobalkanika 1, (2010): pp. 17-23. Indeed, 
in relevant Yugoslavian literature as of 1967 and onward, the spelling with a capital M appears 
(Musliman-Muslimani), indicating those who belong to the ethnic group of Muslim residents of Bosnia, 
later to become Bošnjaci. Additionally, X. Bougarel, Od “muslimana "do" Bošnjaka” pitanje nacionalnog 
imena bosanskih muslimana, Rasprave o nacionalnom identitetu Bošnjaka,[From “muslims” to 
“Bosniaks” the national question of the name of Bosnian Muslims] (Collective Volume), (Sarajevo: 
Institut za Istoriju u Sarajevu, 2009), pp. 130-131. Indicative of the vagueness of the content of the term 
“Muslim” is the answer given in the context of an experiential scientific survey at Sarajevo Islamic 
University to the question "which faith do you belong to?" , which was: "to the Muslim one", at a rate of 
8%, while only 67% answered with the correct response of "Islam". See Islamčević et al., Kriza 
Bošnjačkog identiteta [The Crisis of Bosniak Identity], (Sarajevo: Fakultet Islamskih Nauka, 2012), pp. 
17-18 and 22. 
12 In the sense of the newly-coined term “Bošnjaštvo” we translate the concept of the ethno-religious 
identity or the Bosnian Muslim ethnic identity or, even, the cultural definition of a nation.  It is a 
synonym of “Srpstvo-Serbism” and “Hrvatstvo-Croatism”. It would correspond, to a certain extent, to the 
Greek term “Romiosyni”.	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association, following the ideological processing that ensued, was primarily perceived by 
Bosnia's religious leadership and then expanded into society. The slogan “Bošnjaštvo is our 
religious obligation"13 coined by hafiz Abdurrahman Kujević is just one of numerous such 
slogans appealing to the faithful of Bosnia. The particular elements that compose Bošnjastvo, 
namely historicity, statism, cultural uniqueness, the role of Islam, etc., were respectively 
highlighted, in their turn. Adnan Jahiċ moves along similar lines when attributing a deep 
religious nuance to this ethnic content by considering its adoption as returning to the "house of 
God" (dar-al-islam).14 Such a view goes beyond moral teaching, since it urges the faithful to 
battle and confers the character of a holy act, namely jihad.  
The view of Bosnian Muslim Professor of Political Science Nijaz Duraković on the 
influence of Islam on the cultural production of Bosnia and its residents is typical. This is what 
he characteristically writes: "…when Bosnia was occupied by the Ottoman, a superior 
civilization was immediately transferred, modernizing state structures and military 
administration and more effectively organizing the feudal system…"15 In the author's view, the 
Ottoman presence had a positive impact, since the society of Bosnia progressed culturally, grew 
economically, its military was strengthened with the new system established by the Ottoman 
Empire and entered its modern history period smoothly. Therefore, there was never any issue of 
liberating Bosnia and Herzegovina in the model of the liberating movements that occurred in the 
whole Balkan Peninsula in the 19th century, particularly in Greece and Serbia, so as to overturn 
Ottoman rule.16 This view is explicitly supportive of the idea of the birth of a nation and 
contributes towards beautifying the role of Ottoman Bosnia, so that the picture of the medieval 
conqueror as a benefactor would be reinforced in the whole of society. This has resulted in 
religious Islam “sanctifying” ethnic origin, relieving it of undesirable elements, and, ultimately, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ab. Kujević 'Bošnjaštvo nam je vjerska obaveza',[ Bošnjaštvo is our Religious Duty] with characteristic 
declarations expressed at www.youtube.com/watch?v=TpDgECiGnUA – also cf. by the same 'Hutba-
Bošnjaštvo je sinonim islama', at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yKAn4OM1TkQ. 
14 Cf. the comments by X. Bougarel Bosnian Islam, op. cit., pp. 121-122. In the view of Adnan Jahić, the 
legal system heralded is more similar to a semi-theocratic regime influenced by the West, which would 
appear in political science as 'Islamic Republic'.     
15 N. Duraković Prokletstvo Muslimana [Damnation of Islam], (Tuzla: Harfo-Graf, 1998), p. 16. 
16 When faced with this type of argument that does not hold up to scientific criticism, we cannot but refer 
the reader to the monumental monograph by M. Ekmečić, Ustanak u Bosni 1875-1878 [Uprising in 
Bosnia], (Sarajevo: Izdavačko preduzeće 'Veselin Masleša', 1960). This voluminous book indicates in the 
most detailed and strictly scientific manner what the role of the Ottomans, of economy, society, culture 
and the hunger for freedom of all residents of Bosnia was from the beginning of the 19th century until its 
final liberation.	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bestowing the content of identity to it. This “sanctified” Bosnian Islam is often promoted as an 
Islamic model within European structures. In other words, Bosnian-Muslim historians try to 
present this socio-religious model as the cradle of Islam in the heart of Europe.   
When defining the goals and particularities of Pan-Islamism in South-East Europe, Serbian 
academic Radovan Samardžić wrote: 
…Those belonging to Pan-Islamism are, in fact, vectors of a belligerent branch of a 
multi-ethnic religious community where citizens do not belong to the same ethnic group, 
the same historic tradition, do not have a common cultural past or language, but they 
define religion as the universal regulator of their social and personal lives… Islam is at 
the top of the pyramid and their correlation with Islam, in particular within specific 
circles, officially signifies entering the realm of human consciousness and a substantial 
relationship with the divine.17 
 
What is also distinct on the part of Bosnian-Muslims is disclaiming the view that the political 
ideology of Islam was a decisive parameter in defining the Bošnjaštvo ideology. The potent 
argument they forcefully put forward to support this is the political-religious difference of Islam 
when compared to the Byzantine and Serbian tradition, "…who are no different in ideology from 
the Catholics and Protestants of Europe".18 There is a well-established group of Bosnian Muslim 
historians stating that the three religions were created in respect to the three ethnic communities 
in Bosnia already in the early Middle Ages. Mehmedalija Bojić characteristically expresses this 
view when he writes: 
…With the eradication of the supporters of the Bosnian Church and their conversion to 
the three religions during the 16th century, three strong religious communities were 
established in Bosnia: the Muslim one, the Orthodox Christian one and the Roman 
Catholic one.  It was from these three communities that three distinct ethnic entities were 
formed in the 19th century, namely Bošnjaci-Muslimani, the Serbs and the Croatians.19  
In other words, what is used as documentation is the view expressed by the Christians of 
medieval Central Europe in the doctrine: "Cuius regio, eius religio". Scholarship, however, is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 R. Samardžić, Prodor islama u jugoistočnu Evropu [Penetration of Islam into Europe], (Beograd: 
Uporedna idtraživanja, 1991) pp. 35-54. At this point the reader can compare the view of Adil 
Zulfikarpašić on pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism in the analyses of M. Jevtić, Panislamizam i panturkizam 
u ideologiji Adila Zulfikarpašića, Od Islamske deklaracije do verskog rata u BiH (Prilog “Islamska 
Deklaracija” Alije Izetbegovića) [Panislamism and Panturkism in the ideology of Adil Zulfikarpašiċ, 
From the Islamic Declaration to Religious War in B&H (Appendix “Islamic Declaration of Alija 
Izetbegoviċ), (Prnjavor: Grafomotajica, 1995), pp. 69-77.  
18 See M. Imamović Historija Bošnjaka, op. cit., p. 145. 
19  M. Bojić, Historija Bosne i Bošnjaka [History of Bosnia and Bošnjakdom], (Sarajevo: T.K.D., 
Šahinpašić, 2001), p. 59.  
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (NOVEMBER 2014) XXXIV, 5  
   
Page 7 
called upon to investigate the following question: which religion cultivates direct involvement in 
the shaping of the ethnic groups' political agendas, entrenching 'holy texts' as state laws on the 
basis of theocratic sentiments? In the case at hand, it is obvious from the political options 
projected on the political scene that religion is politicized not only as dogmatic teaching, but – 
mainly – as a social function that clearly acquires political and cultural features of the new 
nation. The use of naming the new nation, due to its religious past (musliman=Bošnjak) echoes 
religion itself, so as to distinguish the evolution of the ethnological phenomenon from that of 
other groups of the same race and language, who they used to be cohabiting with until recently. 
For Bosnian Muslim historians it seems that the major event that contributed to the ethnic 
mutation of the native residents of the broader Bosnia territory during the Middle Ages was their 
religious assimilation by Islam, which led to the creation of the “Bosnian Muslim nation”20.   
Of course, there have also been spiritual movements within the Muslim intelligentsia and 
literature, which were sometimes oriented towards the Serbian and at other times towards the 
Croatian national choice. Interactions in the course of these trends influenced their public 
discourse and often contributed to the transformation of the terms Bošnjak and Musliman. 
Printed material of an educational and literary content, such as Behar and Gajret, became the 
voice of such tendencies and hosted articles by Muslim literary authors as well as by the 
members of the Bosnian intelligentsia.21 There have also been, however, some “heretics” 
concerning the coalescence of the national and religious entity on the part of Muslims. A typical 
case illustrating this is Šukrija Kurtović, who underlined the difference between the ethnic and 
the religious aspect. Indeed, because he was fully aware of his own Serbian origin, he sought to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This is what M. Imamović writes: “…devotion to Islam decisively shaped the Bosnian-Muslim or else 
Bosnian ethnic group, just like it happened in the rest of the southern Slavic groups who spoke the same 
language (Serbs, Croatians, Montenegrins), which, of course, have a different religion, culture and 
political experience.” (Historija Bošnjaka, op. cit.), p. 9. 
21 Ibrahim Kemura. Uloga Gajreta u društvenom životu Muslimana 1903-1941 , (Sarajevo: V. Masleša, 
1986). Cf. Gajret for its pro-Serbian orientation in the article by A.Jahić,”O neuspjehu nacionaliziranja 
bosanskohercegovačkih muslimana u Monarhističkoj Jugoslaviji”[About the Lack of Success of Bosnia-
Herzegovinian Muslims in Monarchist Yugoslavia] (Center for History, Democracy and Reconciliation), 
p. 6.  Regarding this concern a Conference was titled: 'Suočavanje sa prošlošću-  put ka budućnosti; 
Istorija Jugoslavije u dvadesetom veku [Confronting the Past, Path toward the Future:  History of 
Yugoslavia in the Twentieth Century]– Opatija, Beograd 2009', at 
http://www.centerporhistory.net/index.php?option. 
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find a common base for the political co-habitation of the Serbs and the Muslim residents of 
Bosnia.22 
Nevertheless, a contradiction arises which, in my view, has not yet been sufficiently 
interpreted by Muslim historians. Šukrija Kurtoviċ is meaningful in the context of the religiosity 
sown by the Ottoman, it also hails fighters who struggled for the independence of Bosnia.  Such 
a fighter was the famous Visier Husein Kapetan Gradašćević (1802-1834), who resisted in arms 
against the Ottoman yoke.  Another person honored as a glorious defender of Bosnia and its 
ideals is Ali Paša Rizvanbegovič (1783-1851), who collected troops, fought and finally defeated 
Gradašćević; Sultan Mohammed II rewarded him handsomely for this action (1789-1839).23 This 
contradiction entails the fact that present-day Bošnjaci honor the persecutors of the Caliphate as 
well as its defenders as 'national heroes' who in fact fought at the same time period. They pay 
tribute to both Gradašćević and Rizvanbegović. These internal contradictions indicate the darker 
aspects of the Bošnjaštvo phenomenon. 
A careful observer would recognize the common ground in the historical argumentation of 
Bosnian Muslims, namely the dual position: on the one hand, the two-way course of direct 
interaction between Bošnjaštvo and the Islamic religious factor, and on the other, the view 
collectively adopted that an anti-Serbian or anti-Croatian stance to the idea of Bošnjaštvo is, in 
essence, anti-Islam; in other words, the deeper causes of the emerging dispute are religious.24 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Radical Islamic circles regard Kurtović's “vision” and views as “perfidious” and “acquiescent” in 
relation to the self-awareness of the Muslim community. Bataković Dušan is most successful in his 
commentary of Kurtović’s political actions and of the persecutions of the Serbs after the attempted 
murder on the heir to the Austrian-Hungarian throne in 1914 in Sarajevo. An event that, as he comments, 
came hand in hand with the newly renewed cooperation between the Roman Catholics and the 
Muslims.  D. Bataković. La Bosnie-Herzegovine: le System des Lalliances, Islam the Balkans and the 
Great Powers (XIV-XX centuries), ed. Terzić Slavenko, (Beograd: S.A.N.U., 1997), pp. 335-347. Cf. Š 
Kurtović “Nacionalizovanje muslimana,” [Nationalization of Muslims] Narod, [Sarajevo] 1914. A view 
that differs from that expressed by Bataković is expressed by R. Donia, who characterizes Muslim 
politicians with a Serbian or Croatian orientation as “ephemeral choices” aiming at an illustrious career 
course.  Behind the apparent Serbian or Croatian national-ideological choice, there was a latent "Muslim 
politician who never deviated from his religious center", according to the American historian. See R. 
Donia, “Vještački nalaz,” [Artificial Finding](Časopis za Suvremenu Povijest, et. 36, No.1, 2004): p. 84. 
23 See Ham. Kapitžić, Ali-paša Rizvabegović i njegovo doba [Ali-paša Rizvabegoviċ and His Time], 
(Sarajevo: A.N.U.BiH i Filozofski fakultet u Sarajevu, 2001). As for Gradašević, also known as “the 
Dragon of Bosnia – Zmaj Bosne”, he died displaced and under unclear circumstances in Constantinople at 
a young age.   For a comparison of the two heroes see M. Jevtić, Od Islamske deklaracije, op. cit., p. 60. 
24 This view was found in M. Filipović, M. Bojić, M. Hatžijahić, Mustafa Cerić , S. Balić, as well as in 
the works by other historical and religious leaders of Islam, who – in order to strengthen their ethnic 
views – present the ideas of their adversaries using epithets such as: "antimuslimanska”-anti-Muslim, 
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Professor Mustafa Cerić, former Reis-l-ulema of the Islamic community, further specified the 
limits of this polemic against Islam as a practice of the European forces. What he meant was that 
Europe was behind the persecution of Bosnian Muslims: "…They accuse us for being faithful to 
Islam! They accuse us of being criminals...which means that Islam commits crimes in Europe".25  
Another point confirmed is also that the Muslim of Bosnia did not raise the dilemma of 
exploiting one's religious sense to construct a nationalistic ideology. There was never such a 
necessity from within. Benjamin Braude supports, in this case, "ethnicity was based on 
religiosity and common cultural origin, whereas the concept of the state underpinned in the 
context of territorial presence".26 There was a manifest acceptance of the fact that the national 
and the religious fully coincide.  In any case, it is clear and blatantly obvious that Bošnjatvo uses 
religious terms to define its identity. This is why it self-exempts the presence of Serbs and 
Croatians of other faiths from its political content; the result is that it limits itself to its own 
faithful, but also opens up communication channels with others of the same faith at an 
international level, such as, for example, the Turks.  This explains the psychological affinity felt 
by present-day Muslim residents of Bosnia with a Turkish businessman establishing himself as a 
professional in Bosnia. A coupling of a Bosnian Muslim with a Turk favors the relationship as 
opposed to, for example, a coupling of a Bosnian Muslim with a German.    
Another aspect holding together the relation between Bošnjaštvo and religion in Bosnia in 
the 21st century is the secular character of the latter. This secularization, which is mainly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
"antiislamska”-anti-Islamic, "antibošnjačka”-anti-Bosnian, as synonyms or of exactly the same meaning, 
in other cases.  This way, they attribute religious features to their national ‘birth”.  A good illustration of 
this view is the monograph by   H. Čaušević, Antiislamski sindrom kao faktor destrukcije Bosne i 
Hercegovine,[Anti-Islamic Syndrome as a Factor of Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina] (Sarajevo: 
Biblioteka 'Tribina', V.K.B.I., 1994). Most frequently, this argument was put forward in discussions with 
international community representatives so as to strengthen the diplomatic aspects of their argumentation 
in the context of a holy war during the civil conflict that broke out in 1992-93 between Serbians-Croatians 
and Bosnian Muslims. See also Ath. Athanassiadis, Ο εµφύλιος πόλεµος στη Γιουγκοσλαβία 1990-1995. 
Πτυχές της ιστορικής και θρησκευτικής του διάστασης, [The Civil War in Yugoslavia (1990-1995), 
Historical and Religious Aspects], (Thessaloniki: Vanias, 2008), pp. 305-326. 
25 M. Cerić, Islam u Bosni, [Islam in Bosnia](Sarajevo: V.K.B.I. i Rijaset Islamske zajednice 'El – Kalem', 
1994), p. 12. 
26 B. Braude – B. Lewis, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural 
Society, (New York-London: Holmes & Meier, 1982), p. 77.  
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reflected in texts by clerics,27 acquires a tone of political discourse.  To the unsuspecting reader 
who is not aware of the priestly capacity of the reis-u-lema, the public discourse expressed seems 
to be primarily political and secondarily religious.28 This is what makes the penetration of sacred 
Quranic elements obvious in fulfilling secularized social mandates. At the same time, though, in 
the rationale of a faithful Muslim in Bosnia, this action is, on the one hand, a justification of their 
religiosity, and, on the other, a call to fulfill the expectations of their faith. This organic relation 
developed between Bošnjaštvo and the faithful feeds reinforces their ethnic inter-connection.        
The “ethnic Islam”--if this un-scholarly term may be used--for Bosnian Muslims, becomes 
a point of reference and acquires the value of an ethnic-cultural decree, which, when threatened, 
brings together all organic members of the same faith,  who rush to help.  In the Muslim world 
camp, the case of this ethnic-cultural decree has operated as a quasi-threat, which, from a 
religious point of view required its moral and military intervention.  The impact of this measure 
is confirmed by the participation of volunteer soldiers in the war against Serbia and Croatia in 
the bloody events of the '90s.29  
The clerical status quo was closely related and went hand in hand with political parties that 
appeared--at least in the beginning--in the independent state (BiH). The ideological axis along 
which the clergy moved and influence their flock was based on the Quranic principle of the 
"brotherhood of the faithful". The aim was to establish the prerequisite conditions that would 
shape the political platform on the basis of which the ethnic notion was to be negotiated first, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Cf. M. Cerić, Islam u Bosni, op. cit., passim and M. Cerić, Bajramska Hutva-Poruka [Bairamic Hutva-
Message], (Sarajevo: Povodom Ramazanskog bajrama, El-Kalem, 2000), passim. The Islamic-clerical 
discourse expressed in Bosnia is directly connected/associated with the promotion of the “national 
language,” “bosančica”, resulting in mutual strengthening of the prestige of both poles, namely that of the 
new language and religion. Cf. the excellent comments by P. Lekkas in Nationalistic Ideology, as above, 
p. 192. 
28 J. Rob. Donia,” Nationalism and Religious Extremism in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo since 1990,” 
(“Europe”, 14.6.2007), in which the Professor at Michigan University analyzes the penetration of 
religious nationalism into the political life of Bosnia.    
29 See Gilles Kepel: Jihad, the Holy War op. cit. and Ath. Athanassiadis, The Civil War in Yugoslavia, as 
above,  pp. 305-311; Cf. the views expressed by  Sulejman Mašović, Genocide against Boshniaks, 
Religion and the War in Bosnia, ed. Paul Mojzes, (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1998), pp. 145-150. 
It is without a doubt that the phenomenon of ideological volunteers (nationalists) was one that also drew 
the attention of the Serbians who came to notice the Russian and Greek volunteers taking action to assist 
their Serbian counterparts sharing in the same religion. However, these two cannot be compared, either 
quantitatively or qualitatively, in view of the fact that the Greek volunteers were very few while the 
Russians where dozens. On the contrary, it was noted, that on the battlefields of the Serbian-Bosnian war 
of the ‘90s, there was a large number of “Mujahedeen religious warriors” originating from Muslim 
countries. 
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followed by the state with its prevailing religious features at stake. The political 'Islamic 
Declaration-Islamska Deklaracija' was the spark for even closer cooperation of the religions 
intervention in public life and the demands by the political world in B&H (and the S.D.A. Party 
in particular) for a state organized along religious ideals 30 . The interconnection of the 
Declaration-Deklaracija with its religious background is described in the most vivid and 
revealing manner by the then leader of the Islamic Community, Jakub Selimovski: 
...Viewed from the religious point of view, the Declaration should not be inflaming with 
its content, particularly where the Muslims are in the minority among residents, since it is 
a religious mandate that social structures should be organized on the basis of Islamic 
principles. Since Islam has its own terms and its own rules for social, political and, even, 
economic life.31 
Therefore, the leader of the Islamic Community encourages the faithful to establish an Islamic 
state, reflecting the political choice of the religious leadership on Alija Izetbegović's Party 
(S.D.A.). However, this political choice by the religious leader did not constitute a homogenous 
political platform that was to be adopted by all Yugoslavian Muslims. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Imams and hodjas within holy mosques as well as trustworthy persons inside and outside Bosnia 
disseminated propaganda to impose the name Bošnjak on all the Muslim of Yugoslavia. Fanatic religious 
Islamists delivered 'vehabija' [Wahabi] speeches spreading fear and exercizing  psychological pressure 
and imposing unfair measures to achieve their goals. See Av. Kurpejović, “Muslimani Crne Gore do 
bošnjačke asimilacije,” [Muslims of Montenegro to Bošnjak Assymilation] (OSVIT glas Muslimana Crne 
Gore, Matica Muslimanska Crne Gore 5 (2013), pp. 25-27. 
31 'Preporod', (Sarajevo, 15.1.1991), p. 20.	  	  
